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Abstract
The task of designing secure software systems is fraught with uncertainty, as data on uncommon
attacks is limited, costs are difficult to estimate, and technology and tools are continually
changing. Consequently, experts may interpret the security risks posed to a system in different
ways, leading to variation in assessment. This paper presents research into measuring the
variability in decision making between security professionals, with the ultimate goal of
improving the quality of security advice given to software system designers. A set of thirty nine
cyber-security experts took part in an exercise in which they independently assessed a realistic
system scenario. This study quantifies agreement in the opinions of experts, examines methods
of aggregating opinions, and produces an assessment of attacks from ratings of their components.
We show that when aggregated, a coherent consensus view of security emerges which can be
used to inform decisions made during systems design.
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Introduction
Today, an ever-growing number of sensitive transactions of data take place on-line (e.g., e-
government, internet banking and e-commerce), and cyber crime has become prevalent. One of
the consequences of this is that the cybersecurity of information systems has become an
increasing concern. Assessing the level of risk posed by specific events is an area of ongoing
interest for most (if not all) organisations, leading to a requirement for scientific methods of
validating the cybersecurity of software systems.
The questions posed by this special issue are:
1. ‘What are the foundational, measurable, and repeatable scientific elements
applicable to assuring the cybersecurity of software systems?’
In the real world, the subjective opinions of cybersecurity experts are used to assess the
security of software systems in their design stage. Indeed, this is often the only way to
make such assessment. However, the human elements involved introduce the potential
for inconsistency both between experts, and within the experts themselves. In this paper
we show how the opinions of experts can be elicited and measured, and how we can
ameliorate (and measure) the effects of their inherent variation through aggregation to
produce a consistent and repeatable assessment.
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2. ‘How should we verify and validate software systems in terms that will provide
indisputable scientific evidence that they are secure?’
We contend that ‘indisputable evidence’ of security is not a practical concept in the real-
world, as no system can be guaranteed to be without security risks for any length of time.
Furthermore, we argue that independent, measured, ‘proven’ expert opinion should be
used to verify and validate software systems. Repeated successful assessments by
cybersecurity experts provide the historical scientific evidence that their opinions are a
valid and proven method of assuring the security of software systems. The job of security
practitioners is to make an informed judgement as to whether the system is secured to an
appropriate degree for the threat environment it faces.
The work described in this paper addresses two key topics of interest, Measuring Human Factors
in Security – In the method we present, human experts are used to validate software systems.
Perceptions of security vary both between experts, and within an individual expert. Our method
allows us to explicitly measure this variation, and produce an assessment that accounts for it.
Quantitative Security Management – The outcome of the proposed method is a quantification of
expert opinion of the security of a system, including a measurement of uncertainty. These values
can be used to make decisions regarding the implementation of a software system, and the
management of its security framework.
In the proposed method we use two different types of survey to elicit the opinions of a group of
security experts. The first involves ranking a series of technical attacks on a system in order of
how difficult they are to carry out undetected by the system or its operators. The second requires
experts to rate components of attacks in terms of aspects which are thought to contribute to their
overall difficulty. In practice, a system is only as secure as its weakest element, i.e., the easiest
way in. Identifying which are the weakest aspects of a system, i.e., the ‘easiest’ ways of
attacking it, is thus a highly relevant component of system security assessment, though obviously
it does not provide all of the answers.
We have applied the method to measure variation within a set of thirty nine highly experienced
expert practitioners including system and software architects, security consultants, penetration
testers, vulnerability researchers and specialist systems evaluators.
This paper shows how we are able to use expert opinion to produce a consistent assessment, and
identify outliers. We also discuss the meaning of the results, and how the approach could be
applied in future work.
Motivation
Designing and assessing a secure systems architecture is an increasingly complex problem due to
the diversification and expansion of technology which has taken place over the last few years.
For example, in recent years there has been a vast expansion in use of shared/collaborative
services, and in the use of virtualisation technologies such as in provision of cloud services.
Architectures are more fluid and there are few established security models.
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Defensive security technologies have also become more complex, and in some cases it is far
from clear what a product actually does or how well it does its job. Trends which have
complicated the picture include the greater use of after-the-fact heuristic techniques in products
such as anti-virus or IDS systems, the greater use of isolation techniques such as sandboxing, and
complex aggregation and analysis of observed data by security vendors.
Threat assessment has also become more complex, as sophisticated attack techniques have
proliferated via toolsets available on the Internet, placing sophisticated capability into
unsophisticated hands. These rapid changes make it difficult for experts to make consistent, well
founded judgements about what secure architecture and design practices to adopt.
Background
While others have examined the aggregation of experts' opinions for security assessment, we are
not aware of any work that assesses the variation in security expert decision making with regard
to ranking attacks by difficulty, and rating how difficult it is to compromise/bypass their
components. Related work detailing the aggregation of experts’ opinions for security
assessments will be described, as this task shares many similarities with the problem addressed
by the proposed method.
Tan and Li (2012) propose a combination of Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and
information entropy for representing group decision making when assessing security risks. AHP
(Saaty, 1990) is a method of decision making that involves breaking problems down into a
hierarchy of more manageable problems, which are then compared to assign a relative weighting
and assessed individually. Then, a level of risk for the overall problem is calculated using the
individual assessments and weightings. In this case experts’ weightings are calculated using
information entropy, which takes into account their professional status and the credibility of their
submitted opinion. Their opinions are aggregated using a process involving a weighted
geometric mean that produces an overall opinion. The authors provide an example showing how
three experts’ opinions of the level of risk posed by a set of security threats are combined using
the proposed method.
A method proposed by Chan (2010) uses a Bayesian index to combine experts’ opinions of
security risk into one information security (IS) risk model. Bayesian models provide the means
to compute the probability of high or low information risk based on a set of risk indicators. In
this study, eleven experts created a list of security risk indicators and assigned weights to them.
The resulting Bayesian model was validated with forty one companies, each of which completed
a survey regarding their IS protection measures, and the occurrence of IS incidents during the
past two years. The results show that there was high correlation between the companies’
Bayesian indexes and experts’ judgements.
Goyette and Karmouch (2011) propose a method of assessing the security of virtual networks.
This is a particularly problematic area of information security as service providers do not have
details of the physical infrastructure over which the virtual network operates. A combination of
Dempster-Shafer theory (Dempster, 1968) and MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a
Categorical Based Evaluation Technique) are used to provide the means for experts to make
asynchronous contributions to an IS model. Dempster-Shafer theory is a method of combining
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evidence from multiple sources to produce a degree of belief about a question, and MACBETH
is a decision making tool used by a group of experts to rank alternatives that depend upon
multiple criteria. Experts submit their opinions through a series of questions and a confidence
index in their answers. The experts’ opinions are aggregated using Dempster-Shafer theory to
produce a set of degrees of belief. The authors demonstrate the model with a numerical example
involving five experts, where their opinions on one value judgement are fused in a way that does
not require the experts to be in the same physical location, or indeed submit their opinions at the
same time.
Secure systems design is a problem with inherently high levels of uncertainty. For example, the
potential vulnerabilities of products, and how they may evolve over time, must be estimated.
Potential new attacks, including previously unseen categories of attacks must also be estimated –
and this may be over long timescales if considering the service life of the system. Fuzzy Logic
(Zadeh, 1973) is particularly well suited to tasks of this nature as it allows us to model the
uncertainty that is present in information systems security problems and the experts who make
decisions regarding them. A variety of methods based on fuzzy techniques have been applied in
areas closely related to that being addressed in this paper.
A method of risk analysis that uses similarity measures with fuzzy sets is proposed by Chen &
Chen (2003). Security risks of a system component are rated by looking at the risk of failure of
each of its sub-components, and the severity of losing them. Experts rate each sub-component
using linguistic terms (represented by fuzzy sets), and overall risk for a component is computed
using a weighted average of the risks associated with the sub-components. The result of the
averaging process (a fuzzy set) is then compared to nine linguistic terms using a similarity
measure. The most similar term is selected to describe the risk for the component. An example
shows how multiple experts’ opinions along with their degree of confidence in their assessments
can be used to produce an overall risk assessment for a component. The method is shown to be a
suitable method of aggregating risks associated with sub-components by multiple experts to form
a group opinion of an entire system.
In Garibaldi and Ozen (2007) the authors propose the use of ‘nonstationary’ fuzzy reasoning to
model the variation in expert decision making in a medical case study. Nonstationary fuzzy
systems introduce small variations to the model over time, mimicking the temporal variation
found in the opinions of real-world experts. This work builds on work in which a standard fuzzy
system is used to model medical experts’ opinion in the context of umbilical acid base analysis,
whereby properties of blood taken from the umbilical cord after child birth are used to determine
the health of a new born child. A set of rules for the system was created through consultation
with experts, and the system was tuned using the experts’ judgements. Fifty cases that were said
to be difficult to interpret were selected from a database of ten thousand cases, and each expert
was asked to rank them in order from ‘worst’ to ‘best’ in terms of health. The standard fuzzy
expert system was then used to produce scores for each of the fifty cases, allowing a ranking to
be produced for comparison with the experts’ rankings. The results show that the ranking
produced by the fuzzy expert system was very close to that produced by the experts. Following
this, the authors show that by introducing variation into the model, the variation within a single
expert over time, and between a group of experts, can be modelled with an approach that does
not produce the same answer every time, despite the same input.
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Sendi et al. (2010) propose the use of FEMRA (Fuzzy Expert Model for Risk Assessment), a
system that represents the knowledge of experts, and uses a fuzzy rule base to produce a numeric
value representing risk. A list of assets and threats were identified and three experts were asked
to rate the qualities ‘Confidentiality’, ‘Integrity’ and ‘Availability’ in the range [0,1]. A list of
vulnerabilities was then created, and used with the list of assets and threats to create a list of
risks. Asset values, vulnerability effects and threat effects were rated by the experts, then the
fuzzy model took these values and converted each of them into one of three fuzzy sets ‘Low’,
‘Medium’ and ‘High’. A rule base was created which allowed the combination of these sets to
produce an output set determining risk. The final output of the system is an index of risk value
produced by ‘defuzzifying’ the output set, that can be used by managers to decide on the
appropriate action to be taken.
Feng and Li (2010) put forward an Information Systems Security (ISS) risk assessment model
that uses fuzzy sets to represent the degree of belief for a statement based on current evidence.
The model is demonstrated using a real world case study of a Chinese financial service’s
information systems. Six experts rated the strength of the evidence, in this case
components/effects of risks, which are represented using fuzzy sets. For comparison three other
approaches were tested: Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation (FCE), Bayesian Networks
(BNs) and traditional Dempster-Shafer theory. The authors state that their method is an
improvement over the other methods tested as it reduces the uncertainty inherent in conflicting
evidence provided by multiple experts.
Wu et al. (2009) demonstrate an improved version of AHP based on fuzzy sets to be used for risk
assessment of information systems. Two hierarchies are constructed (as in traditional AHP), one
representing the probability of an incident (a combination of threats and vulnerabilities), the
other representing the impact of an incident (a combination of recovery costs and severity).
Experts are asked to rate the factors at the bottom of the hierarchies, their opinions are
represented using fuzzy sets. These opinions are then combined to complete the AHP, producing
a risk vector. An example is given in which three experts assess the factors identified in a
hierarchy, and these opinions are combined to produce a comprehensive fuzzy judgement matrix.
The elements of the matrix are then weighted and used to produce a risk vector.
Fuzzy sets are used for information security risk assessment in research carried out by Fu et al.
(2008). Three categories (Asset, Threat and Survivability (Vulnerability)) are rated by experts
using nine linguistic variables that quantify the risk (e.g., ‘very little’ loss or ‘very high’ threat),
the experts’ opinions are then aggregated using the Delphi method (Linstone and Turoff, 1975).
The Delphi method involves gathering experts’ opinions in a number of rounds. After each
round, an anonymous summary of the experts’ opinions and reasoning is shown, and the experts
are asked again for their opinion. The idea is that experts may revise their opinions in light of
their colleagues’ opinions and reasoning. The technique stops when a pre-defined criteria is met
(e.g., number of rounds, consensus reached). An overall fuzzy number is produced using all of
the categories of risk, which is then defuzzified to produce a risk index. An example shows how
the method works, in which the opinions of three experts are used to calculate a description of
risk for a synthetic system.
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Methodology
A key part of this research is the elicitation of opinions from a group of cybersecurity experts
about how difficult it is to complete attacks and compromise/bypass components for a given
system design. The opinions are then used to produce a consistent measurement.
Our partnership with CESG gives us a level of access to such experts that would be difficult to
attain otherwise. As the National Technical Authority for Information Security in the UK, CESG
has access to a cadre of specialist security architects and other technical security experts, and can
draw on both public and private sector expertise.
The methodology was tested in scenarios involving expert analysis of factors relating to
attacking a system’s architecture. Three knowledge extraction exercises were performed. The
following sections describe the initial exercise, a follow up prototype exercise and the main
exercise, respectively.
Initial Exercise
The purpose of the initial exercise was to develop a scenario consisting of a system together with
various methods / vulnerabilities / attacks, realistic enough to permit reasoned assessment, while
being difficult to assess fully, even by leading experts. A scenario was created by a senior
member of CESG technical staff that is designed to be representative of a fairly mainstream
government system. The system involves a range of core services and back end office facilities
together with remote sites and mobile access. Core systems hold the most sensitive business
information, with assets rated in terms of their value at Business Impact Level 3 (BIL3)
following the standard UK government scheme (CESG, 2009). This scale rates the impact of an
event from BIL0 (no consequences) to BIL6 (catastrophic).
Six technical experts from CESG were presented with the scenario, the creator of the scenario
described the system in detail, showing diagrams of various aspects of the system, and answering
experts’ questions. The group then carried out a mock security review of the architecture, a task
highly familiar to them. As a group they were then challenged to identify ten different ways of
mounting an end-to-end attack on the system, identifying all individual attack elements involved.
The end to end attacks are termed ‘attack vectors’ (AVs), and individual elements are termed
‘hops’. Once a set of ten AVs had been established, the experts were asked to rank them from one
to ten in order of how difficult each was to carry out undetected. This was done without the
experts communicating with one another to ensure that each individual gave their opinion without
outside influence. Even with the experts’ in-depth knowledge of information security this was a
task with a fair degree of uncertainty, as much of the detail required to precisely assess difficulty
was absent. For example, no information was provided about the exact software and hardware
being used in the proposed system. Participants were asked to assume that it was of the typical
standard that would be used in a government system of this type. All of the experts involved in the
exercise regularly work with UK government BIL3 systems, and so are aware of associated
security policy and how it is typically applied to such systems in terms of component
configuration, frequency of anti-virus updates, etc. Having ranked the ten AVs, the technical
experts were then asked to rate each of the hops by difficulty (either ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’),
and rate their confidence in their answer (as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’), again, this was conducted
in isolation. The confidence rating was provided to allow the experts to show
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uncertainty in their answer, whether it is caused by a lack of clarity in the scenario/hop
description, a lack of knowledge of a particular technology (e.g., cryptography), or other sources
of uncertainty.
Data Analysis
Having collected the data, analysis was performed to examine the variation in opinion within the
group. This section contains the outcome of the data analysis activity for this initial exercise. In
Table 1, each expert is compared to the group response produced by taking the average ranking
of each AV and sorting them into ascending order. The difference column shows the distance
between each expert’s ranking and the group rank, and Spearman’s rho is used to compare each
expert’s rank order with the group rank order. Finally, Kendall’s W is used to compute the rank
correlation within the group of all six experts. Spearman’s rho measures the statistical
dependence of two sets of rankings, correlation is measured on a scale from -1 (perfect negative
correlation), through 0 (no correlation), to +1 (perfect positive correlation). Kendall’s W is a
similar measure used to calculate the agreement between rankings from a group of people,
producing values from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). These correlation measures
are particularly useful in cases like the one described here, where we are working with a set of
subjective rankings, produced by humans.
A B C D E F
Difference 8 14 18 10 6 4
Spearman’s Rho 0.90 0.78 0.77 0.92 0.94 0.96
Kendall’s W 0.82
Table 1 - Initial Exercise AV Ranking
The results show that there is a clear positive correlation between the individual rankings and the
group rank, and that there is a strong correlation between the individuals themselves. In order to
determine whether the averaging processes involved would always result in a high level of
correlation, a random set of rankings was produced. For comparison, Table 2 shows the result of
the same process using random rankings, which show that the correlation is significantly worse
than that produced by the experts.
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Difference 24 16 30 20 42 26
Spearman’s Rho 0.25 0.75 0.30 0.61 -0.15 0.25
Kendall’s W 0.12
Table 2 - Random AV Ranking
Figure 1 shows the agreement within the group, the x-axis represents the average ranking for the
set of all 6 experts, and each of the corresponding experts’ ranks are shown on the y-axis. The
height of the columns denotes how many experts assigned a particular ranking to an AV. Again,
for comparison, Figure 2 shows the result of a group of random rankings.
Figure 1. Group Agreement Figure 2. Group Agreement
Initial Exercise Random
The results of this initial exercise show that while this group of experts may have different areas
of expertise, and the scenario contains omissions and uncertainties, the rankings produced by the
experts have a high degree of correlation, suggesting that there is a consensus about which AVs
are more difficult than others. The comparison with random rankings shows that this level of
agreement is not an artefact of the averaging process. These findings were taken into
consideration when creating the main exercise which includes a larger and more disparate group
of experts, the aim being to explore how decision making varies within and between groups of
individuals from different parts of the cyber-security community.
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Prototype Exercise
Although the previous study shows that using the experts’ AV rankings we can demonstrate that
there is a consensus of opinion, when it comes to the hop data we are unable to perform a
detailed analysis. This is because for each hop, experts have only three possible answers,
making any analysis lack the level of detail required to produce a meaningful result.
To address this, a novel approach to capturing expert opinion and expressing subjective
uncertainty was devised that allows participants to make a more detailed differentiation
between hops’ difficulties and their certainty. There are a number of reasons that an expert
could be uncertain in their answer, including:
1. The individual is not familiar with a particular technology.
2. The inherent uncertainty caused by insufficient detail in the scenario (e.g., precise
component and frequency of patching not specified; in some cases this will make
little difference while in others it could be significant).
3. The individual’s personality
(e.g., they may be naturally cautious about making a precise prediction).
Experts gave their answers as an interval, on a scale of 0 to 100. This was done by drawing an
ellipse as shown in Figure 3, which shows an example question with two possible answers, one
more uncertain than the other. The interval is produced using the points where the ellipse
intersects the scale. The width of the interval denotes the uncertainty the expert has in their
answer, the wider the interval, the less certain the expert is. Using this refined method,
participants are able to impart much more information about their uncertainty than was possible
in the initial exercise.
Figure 3. Interval Response where (a) is a Less Uncertain Response and (b) is a More
Uncertain Response
As a trial for the new method of eliciting expert knowledge, an exercise was carried out with PhD
students and researchers from the Intelligent Modelling and Analysis research group at the
University of Nottingham. Participants were asked to rate aspects of a series of restaurants in the
Nottingham city centre area. For example, questions included ‘How polite are the staff?’ and
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‘Overall, how would you rate this eating place?’. Ratings were described using the proposed
method of drawing ellipses (Miller 2012).
The overall response to the use of ellipses was a positive one. The participants liked the use of a
single pen-stroke to determine their answer and their uncertainty.
Main Exercise
A set of thirty nine security professionals from seven groups took part in the main exercise,
drawn from a mixture of government and commercial backgrounds. The groups included system
and software architects, technical security consultants, penetration testers, vulnerability
researchers and specialist systems evaluators. All participants have a high level of expertise, with
both breadth and depth of experience.
The reason for using a larger set of experts from multiple groups is to allow examination of the
variation and agreement within each group, and between groups to see if different specialist
fields of cyber-security differ in their variation and agreement, and how each field varies in its
agreement with other groups.
Data Acquisition
Following the prototype exercise, the main exercise was undertaken using the same method of
eliciting expert opinion. The scenario, AVs and hops from the initial exercise were revisited and
refined in order to provide a clearer definition for the participating experts. The experts were
given a presentation by the scenario creator with details and diagrams of the updated scenario,
AVs (see Figure 4) and hops, and had the opportunity to ask questions about the system. As in
the initial exercise the experts were asked to assume that the software/hardware and frequency of
patching was of the typical standard that they came across in their work with this type of
government system. They all regularly work with UK government BIL3 systems, and so are
aware of associated security policy and how it is typically applied to such systems in terms of
component configuration, frequency of anti-virus updates, etc.
To illustrate the exercise, a diagram of one of the AVs and its constituent hops is reproduced in
Figure 4. The diagram shows the system, hops and path an attacker would take to complete
this attack vector. The experts were presented with this type of diagram for each of the ten
attack vectors. This AV is called ‘Malformed document via email’, and entails an attacker on
the Internet sending an email to a system user which contains a malformed PDF document.
The malformed document contains a malicious exploit that compromises the desktop client
and establishes a presence there in order to mount an ongoing attack. In addition to crafting the
malware, the attacker must also evade detection by the relevant gateway defences, and must
overcome the lockdown applied to the client. There are five distinct hops for this AV:
1. Bypass gateway content checker (i.e., evade detection)
2. Bypass gateway anti-virus
3. Compromise PDF renderer
4. Bypass anti-virus on client
5. Overcome client lockdown (i.e., access controls on the client)
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Note that there is not a hop to bypass the gateway firewall in this attack because the exploit is
carried within legitimate business traffic (i.e., an email), hence no work is required to pass
through the firewall.
Figure 4. Example Attack - ‘Malformed document via email’
The ten AVs that were presented to the experts are as follows:
 Malformed document via email (see Figure 4)
 Compromise central cryptographic device
 Attack via VOIP client
 Attack via network management tools
 Steal credentials and upload malicious document
 Attack via enterprise services
 Entice user to malicious website
 Subvert SAN via virtualisation infrastructure
 Instant Messaging client
 Malicious SQL attack
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Note that these are shown in random order; this is because detail of how specific AVs were
ranked has not been released as part of this dataset. The first part of the exercise consisted of the
experts ranking the ten AVs in order of how difficult they thought it would be to carry out the
attack without being detected. This activity was conducted in examination-like conditions to
ensure that there were no outside influences on the experts’ opinions.
Following this, the second part of the exercise required experts to answer a series of questions
about each of the hops making up the AVs, giving their answers using an ellipse as in the
prototype exercise. The questions were devised in collaboration with CESG’s technical experts
to determine what the important factors are that contribute to the difficulty of hops and AVs. The
resulting questions included (but were not limited to):
1. How mature is this type of technology? (i.e., the component’s technology)
2. How likely is it that there would be a publicly available tool that could help with this
attack?
3. How much does the target component process/interact with any of its data inputs?
4. How complex is the target component (e.g. in terms of size of code, number of
subcomponents)?
The experts were divided up, completing the hop questions in a number of separate rooms in
exam conditions. As there were thirty nine participants and twenty six distinct hops in the
scenario, with up to eight questions per hop, this produced a substantial dataset of around six
thousand observations. We believe this scope of data collection and quantity of data collected
from highly experienced security practitioners to be unprecedented. This larger number of
participants and groups allows us to look at the variation between the individuals within groups,
between groups, and in the overall opinions of the set of thirty nine experts.
Data Analysis – AVs
In the first stage of analysis, work focused on the AV rankings, assessing the level of variation
that occurred between individual experts, and groups of experts. Initially, individual experts’
opinions were studied. Figure 5 shows how the set of thirty nine experts ranked one of the AVs,
AV1. Each point on the x-axis represents one of the thirty nine experts, and the y-axis is used to
show how they ranked AV1.
Two things are apparent from Figure 5:
1. There is a general consensus that AV1 is easy compared to the other AVs (1: Easiest,
10: Hardest). It can be seen that the majority of participants have given a higher
(easier) ranking to AV1.
2. There is a very broad spectrum of opinions. There is at least one individual in the set
that has given each of the complete range of rankings 1 – 10.
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Figure 5. Spread of Rankings for AV1
The other nine AV rankings show a similar level of variation to the one shown in Figure 5, with
nine of them being ranked in at least eight of the ten possible places. This tells us that while there
is agreement within the set, if we were to ask one single expert for their ranking for AV1, we
might get any one of the ten possible rankings. From a security advisory perspective this is
obviously undesirable, as our aim is to provide clear and consistent advice. However, as we will
see, by aggregating the experts’ opinions we can produce a more consistent response.
At group level there is a range of levels of agreement, some of the seven groups are more
consistent than others. Table 3 details the mean Spearman’s rho for individuals of each group
(compared against the group average) and the Kendall’s W for each group. It can be seen that
Group D has the best agreement, and Group G has the least agreement among its members.
Group A B C D E F G
Mean Spearman’s 0.82 0.76 0.83 0.92 0.61 0.66 0.56
Kendall’s W 0.69 0.59 0.72 0.88 0.39 0.47 0.33
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Figures 6 and 7 show agreement among the individuals of Group D and Group G respectively.
As in Figures 1 and 2, the x-axis represents the group average ranking, and the y-axis is used to
show how each expert ranked each of the AVs from the group ranking. The height of the
columns denotes how many experts assigned each ranking to an AV. In these two cases there are
ties in the rankings, meaning that not all of the group ranks are integer values. Obviously, as each
individual has a contribution to the group mean we would expect to see some agreement, but it is
clear that Group D are more consistent than Group G in their decision making.
Figure 6. Group D Agreement Figure 7. Group G Agreement
The next step in the analysis was to look at the entire set of thirty nine experts. Table 4 provides
the Spearman’s rho for each individual’s ranking compared with the set’s mean ranking. The
majority of the set have a strong correlation with the overall consensus opinion, and five
individuals have a particularly weak correlation with the group. By identifying outliers, we
provide the opportunity to investigate further to see why these individuals disagree with the
group, and whether further action is required e.g., further training, or dissemination of new
knowledge.
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Group A B C D E F G
Expert
.a 0.9152 0.6848 0.7212 0.9152 0.2121 0.9394 0.9273
.b 0.7091 0.7212 0.8182 0.9152 0.7576 0.0545 0.6727
.c 0.8303 0.5879 0.8667 0.9273 -0.0182 0.8424 -0.1636
.d 0.7697 0.7333 0.8545 0.7818 0.8545 0.7939 0.4788
.e 0.2848 0.6848 0.8667 0.8788 0.7697 0.7818
.f 0.6606 0.7212 0.3212
.g 0.9636
.h 0.4909
Denotes particularly strong
correlation with the group
(Rho>0.7)
Denotes particularly weak
correlation with the group
(Rho<0.3)
Table 4 - Individuals vs. Overall Group
Table 5 and Figure 8 show each group compared with the overall set of thirty nine experts’ mean
ranking. In Figure 8 the x-axis shows the AVs in order of average rank, and the y-axis shows
how the experts ranked each AV. It can be seen that although at individual level there is some
disagreement, when the opinions of each group are aggregated there is a very strong consensus
of opinion providing a consistent measure of AV difficulty.
Group A B C D E F G
Rho 0.891 0.912 0.927 0.948 0.827 0.954 0.948
Table 5 – Groups Compared with Set Mean Ranking
Table 3 - Group Agreement
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Figure 8. All Groups – Inter-group Comparison
Following this, scatter plots were produced to illustrate how the individuals within each group
related to one another, and how the groups related to each other. Two distances were used for the
plot, distance from the set mean ranking, and distance from the scenario creator’s ranking. The
scenario creator is the most senior member of the internal technical teams, and as the creator we
can assume that he has the clearest understanding of the scenario. Because of this, his ranking
can be used as a reference against which to rate others’ responses (although this is not
necessarily considered as ‘correct’). Figure 9 contains the resulting scatter plot.
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Figure 9. Scatter plot showing individuals’ distance from group and scenario creator
As we might expect some of the groups appear to be more disparate than others. For example
Group D is closely grouped, while Group G is spread out more widely, as reflected by the intra-
group agreements shown in Figures 6 and 7. There may be many reasons for this, and it is not
necessarily the case that Group G is inferior to Group D. For example, it may be that Group D are
experts who work together regularly in the same office, and Group G could be individuals who
work in different parts of the country and have never met, and therefore have very different
experiences. However, full details of the groupings are restricted, and as such were not released
as part of this data set, preventing a full examination of the reasons for disparity.
Data Analysis – Hops
The second stage of analysis involves examining the data collected regarding the individual
hops, and potentially relating these to the AVs. As stated previously, the hop rating part of the
exercise required experts to answer a series of questions about the twenty six hops that make up
the ten AVs that were ranked in the previous part of the exercise. The result of the exercise was
a collection of intervals that describe each expert’s opinion of a particular aspect of a particular
hop.
Table 3 - Group Agreement
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For our initial hop analysis, we have focused on one question ‘Overall, how difficult would it be
for an attacker to [successfully make the hop]?’ This question was designed to elicit one overall
difficulty rating for the hop, while the other questions focus on specific aspects of that difficulty.
This initial hop analysis is restricted to Group D, as they were the most consistent in the AV
ranking part of the exercise.
Each of the twenty six hops belongs to one or more of the ten AVs, Table 6 shows which hops
belong to each AV.
AV Hops
1 2,3,1,4,5
2 6,7,6,8,4
3 9
4 10,11,4,5
5 12,13,2,3,14,15,4,5
6 16,16,17,4,5
7 6,18,4,5
8 19,20,21
9 22,23,24
10 25,26,1,4,5
Table 6 - AVs with Constituent Hops
Using this information, the ratings an expert gave for each hop can be used to compute a
difficulty value for each AV. This has been done using a number of methods of aggregation:
1. Sum
2. Minimum
3. Mean
4. Maximum
5. Ordered Weighted Average
Each of these methods has been applied to the minimum, mean and maximum of the hop
intervals for each AV. For example, Table 7 shows Expert D.b’s responses to the ‘Overall’
question for each of the hops in AV1 (2,3,1,4,5).
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Hop Min Mean Max
1 10 25 40
2 30 40 50
3 11 20.5 30
4 30 40 50
5 60 70 80
Table 7 - Expert D.b's ‘Overall’ Intervals for AV1
Any of the aggregation operators above can be applied to these data to compute a difficulty score
for AV1, e.g., mean of mean values (39.1), sum of maximum values (250) or minimum of
minimum values (10). This process can then be repeated for each method for all ten AVs to
produce scores for each method and a value for each AV. The difficulty scores are then used to
rank the AVs, the ranking produced by each method is compared to the actual ranking given by
the expert in the previous exercise. By doing this, the relationship between an expert’s AV
ranking and their hop ratings can be examined.
Discussions with a smaller group of CESG experts had generated a hypothesis that the difficulty
of a given AV may be determined largely by the maximum difficulty of its constituent hops.
However, it became apparent that the use of the maximum or minimum operators in particular
produced a lot of equal scores for AVs, making the resulting AV ranking less meaningful. To help
overcome this difficulty an Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) (Yager 1988) operator was
selected as one of the aggregation methods. An OWA allows more weight to be given to the most
difficult hops, while still taking into account the other hops when rating an AV. This results in a
significant reduction in the number of ties obtained, leading to more meaningful rankings.
An OWA consists of a set of weights (that add up to 1), and a set of objects. In our case the
objects are hop ratings. The first step of the OWA is to sort the objects (hop ratings) into
descending order, so the most difficult hop will be placed at the start of the list. Then, each of
the weights is multiplied by the corresponding object, so the first weight is multiplied by the
first object and so on. If the first weight is high (near to one), then the resultant operator is close
to a maximum. This weighting will then be reflected in the overall score produced for an AV. A
selection of OWA operators were used that gave precedence to hops with higher difficulty
ratings.
As an added complexity, each AV has a different number of hops, so fixed weights cannot be
used with the OWA. Two alternative weighting strategies were used for the experiment, referred
to as OWA(1) and OWA(2). Both use a form of ranking proportionate weighting, OWA (1)
features a steady decrease of weightings, for example an AV with five hops is given a linearly
decreasing weighting {5/15,4/15,3/15,2/15,1/15}. OWA (2) features a much sharper decrease in
Table 3 - Group Agreement
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weights after the most difficult hop, for example an AV with five hops uses weights in
proportion {1/2,1/4,1/8,1/16,1/32}, with the weights normalised to ensure that they sum to one.
Each aggregation operator was applied to the hop rankings given by each of the members of
Group D. Then, for each method, the ranking produced was compared with the actual ranking
given by the individual expert. Table 8 gives a summary of the best results found using the
aggregation operators. The figures shown are Spearman’s rho for the comparison between the
rank derived from the hop data using each of the aggregation methods, and the actual rank
provided by that individual.
Expert D.a D.b D.c D.d Mean
Mean Mean 0.758 0.879 0.830 0.879 0.836
OWA Mean (1) 0.830 0.879 0.867 0.879 0.864
OWA Mean (2) 0.830 0.855 0.891 0.879 0.864
Table 8 - Summary of Hop Aggregation Results
The Spearman’s rho figures show that there is a very high level of correlation between the
rankings that the experts provided in the first part of the exercise, and those derived from their
hop ratings. That is, by combining an individual's hop ratings it is possible to produce AV
rankings that are closely correlated to that same individual's AV rankings. The benefit of using
OWA operators that give more weight the most difficult hops can be seen, as they avoid the tied
rankings produced when using a maximum operator.
Discussion
In the methodology presented in this paper, the subjective opinions of cybersecurity
professionals are used to create a consistent validation of proposed software systems. As well as
providing a metric of security, it also allows systematic identification of:
1. Topics where there is a clearly established consensus of opinion.
2. Topics where there is significant disagreement between experts.
3. Individuals within the community who are consistently making judgements which are
strongly away from the norm.
Note that the consensus opinion is not necessarily presented as the ‘ground truth’; however, if the
level of expertise is high and the degree of agreement is strong then it is more likely to hold true.
In the real world, the use of measured expert opinion is often the only way of achieving a
practical, realistic assessment. We also emphasise that individuals who are making ‘outlier
decisions’ should not be considered as ‘wrong’. In fact, in some cases they may represent people
at the forefront of new knowledge creation. In these cases the individuals have an important role
to play in challenging the ‘group think’. However, in other cases, ‘outliers’ may simply be less
experienced or skilled than the norm. If this is the case, then these individuals could be
considered for targeted training. The identification of, and subsequent interaction with ‘outliers’
therefore needs to be carefully managed.
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In this research we have used the expertise of cybersecurity experts to determine a set of AVs to
work with, we suggest this is the most practical method, as identifying meaningful AVs
automatically is currently a very difficult task for computers to undertake. We’ve used what the
experts believe to be the ten most salient AVs, though the optimal number to use will
undoubtedly vary from system to system dependent upon its complexity. A system is only as
secure as its weakest element, so identifying which are the weakest aspects of a system can form
an important component of system security assessment, though obviously it is not the complete
solution. Further experimentation is required to ascertain the most suitable number of AVs to
use for a particular system.
While only an initial study, the analysis of the hop data has produced some interesting results.
Using a limited set of data, it has been demonstrated that we are able to aggregate hop ratings
for an individual to produce a measure of security for an AV. The rankings produced using these
measures are closely correlated with the experts’ actual AV rankings. From this we can gather
that for these experts, their answer to the ‘Overall’ question for each hop is strongly related to
how they rank AVs containing this hop. While this may seem obvious, it is by no means
guaranteed a priori, due to the fact that the AV ranking and hop analysis were carried out at
different times of the day, and the mapping of hops to AVs is non-obvious.
If this is the case for all of our experts, it suggests that ratings of hops can be used to rank AVs in
order of difficulty. In the future, it may be possible to build a database of hop ratings that can be
used to rank AVs in proposed systems, highlighting those that present greater risk.
Possible applications of the work presented in this paper include:
1. A validation tool, providing guidance on the difficulty of AVs for a proposed software
system, based upon experts’ knowledge of both hops and AVs. This would be very
useful when designing information systems, as it could provide validation of security
for given parts of a proposed system.
2. A methodology for establishing a consensus opinion of multiple experts. The
aggregation process has been shown to reduce the effects of outliers, producing a
more consistent measure of security.
3. A system for identifying outlying experts who may have cutting edge knowledge, or
require support and training. In either case, the ability to identify outlying experts is
critical to our goal of providing clear and consistent advice to system designers.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we show how expert opinion of security can be elicited, measured and aggregated to
produce an assessment for a proposed software system. The inherent variation that occurs with
human experts is reduced, producing a consistent outcome. We present analysis and results of an
exercise involving a set of thirty nine security professionals from seven groups including
government and commercial groups, who were given a scenario created by CESG security
professionals and asked to provide their opinions on ten AVs, and the twenty six hops that made
up the AVs. We believe that a study of this scope and scale with highly experienced security
practitioners to be unique. The analysis of the AV data showed that at individual level there was
variation between individual experts. However, further analysis showed that by aggregating
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rankings we are able to produce rankings that are more consistent, indicating that there is overall
consensus.
The initial analysis performed on hop data produced results that demonstrate how an individual’s
hop rankings can be used to produce a measure of security for an AV, and that the resulting
rankings are highly correlated with individuals’ actual AV rankings. This result tells us that there
is a clear relationship between the difficulty of AVs and the difficulty of constituent hops.
Future lines of research are to include further study of the data collected during the hop rating
exercise. Specifically, this will include widening the scope of the initial analysis to include all
experts to determine whether the results of this study hold for less consistent groups. We will
also explore the answers to the remaining questions asked about each hop in relation to the
‘Overall’ question, and the AV rankings. Other areas of interest with regard to the hop data
include analysis of the uncertainties expressed by the experts, and determining consistencies
between experts. More generally, real-world applications of the work will be considered,
including providing security validation for system designers, establishing a consensus among
experts, and identifying outliers.
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